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The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity.  Ronald 
Niezen.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.  xix + 272 pp., notes, 
references, index.  $49.95 (cloth), $18.95 (paper).  ISBN 0-520-23554-1, 
0-520-23556-8.  [www.ucpress.edu]
ALCIDA RITA RAMOS
University of Brasilia
	 Ronald	Niezen	defines	indigenism	as	“a	social	movement	with	a	strategic	
focus	outside	of	states	that	seeks	to	activate	rights	to	autonomy	within states”	
(p.	136).		Apparently	uninterested	in	indigenism’s	national	manifestations,	the	
author	claims	as	his	object	of	study	“the	world,”	but	contained	in	the	nutshell	
of	the	Palais	des	Nations	in	Geneva	(p.	1).		He	is	so	impressed	with	the	actors	
and	their	actions	at	the	international	arena	of	indigenous	politics	at	the	United	
Nations	that	he	contradictorily	evokes	Benedict	Anderson’s	catchy	concept	of	
imagined	communities	(created	to	highlight	the	emergence	of	nation-states)	
to	imply	more	than	can	possibly	be	implied	in	the	context	of	the	periodic	and	
mostly	episodic	meetings	very	far	away	from	home.		The	attempted	application	
of	Anderson’s	 concept	 in	 the	Geneva	context	 could	not	be	 farther	 from	 its	
original	context.
	 Throughout	the	book	we	find	references	to	disagreements,	bickering,	and	
other	forms	of	dissonance	among	the	indigenous	and	nonindigenous	participants	
in	the	United	Nations	meetings,	but	by	and	large	one	has	the	sense	that	there	
is	an	underlying	harmony	resulting	from	a	common	cause.		Nevertheless,	that	
context	is	far	from	being	a	Turnerian	manifestation	of	communitas	where	all	
indigenous	participants	are	in	a	blessed	state	of	liminality.		There	are	significant	
differences	between	the	representatives	of	the	various	countries,	if	for	no	other	
reason	 than	 the	 fact	 that	 each	one	has	 experienced	what	Ashis	Nandy	has	
identified	as	the	“intimate	enemy”	(in	a	book	of	the	same	name,	1983).		For	
all	the	commonality	of	suffering	that	unites	the	indigenous	participants,	they	
have	coexisted	for	a	long	time	with	distinct	nation-states	and	have,	necessarily,	
internalized	much	of	their	national	ethos.		No	wonder	a	Brazilian	delegate	once	
complained	of	her	discomfort	with	the	overassertiveness	of	Native	Americans	
from	the	United	States,	who	tend	to	dominate	the	discussions	at	the	Palais	des	
Nations.
	 Without	 claiming	 originality	 (as	 his	 bibliography	 indicates),	Niezen’s	
somewhat	repetitive	text	offers	the	reader	the	welcome	testimony	of	a	North	
American	(in	its	geographical	rather	than	geopolitical	sense)	anthropologist	
committed	to	and	long	involved	with	the	cause	of	indigenous	peoples,	and	who	
sees	the	United	Nations	supranational	forum	as	a	hopeful	instrument	to	curb	
state	abuses.		Nevertheless,	the	author	seems	to	oscillate	between	two	opposing	
misapprehensions:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 that	 universalism	 as	 the	 underlying	
logic	of	the	United	Nations	will	bring	to	indigenous	peoples	(via	their	active	
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leaders)	irreversible	changes	and	a	measure	of	inauthenticity;	on	the	other,	that	
relativism,	as	an	implicit	closure	of	dominated	cultures,	will	contribute	to	state	
domination.		
	 I	see	these	concerns	as	misapprehensions	because	neither	universalism	nor	
relativism	exists	in	absolute	terms	or	represents	a	major	force	against	indigenous	
rights.		While	exposure	to	the	technical,	intellectual,	and	social	apparatus	of	the	
human	rights	circuit	affects	indigenous	leaders	directly	involved	with	it,	back	
home	their	respective	indigenous	communities	are	unlikely	to	be	influenced	in	
the	same	way.		In	any	case,	change	is	something	to	which	all	peoples	in	the	world	
are	fully	accustomed.		Moreover,	it	is	the	humanist	strength	of	the	Universal	
Declaration	 of	Human	Rights	 that	 has	 allowed,	 paradoxically,	 indigenous	
peoples	to	seek	strategic	supranational	support	for	sanctions	against	abusive	state	
measures.		Regardless,	it	is	the	insistence	on	relativism	that	provides	indigenous	
peoples	with	the	assurance	that	their	ways	of	life	will	not	the	judged	by	external	
parameters.		As	Todorov	has	proposed	in	Nous et les autres: la réflexion française 
sur la diversité humaine (1983),	ideologically	laden	notions	such	as	universalism	
and	relativism	should	be	taken	not	as	fixed	categories,	but	rather	as	strategic	
devices	 for	 specific	courses	of	action.	 	The	best	evidence	 that	 such	strategy	
works	are	the	successful	outcomes	accomplished	by	indigenous	peoples	at	the	
United	Nations,	such	as	those	mentioned	in	Niezen’s	book	(p.	186).
	 In	other	words,	The Origins of Indigenism	owes	its	readers	a	deeper	and	more	
refined	analysis	of	the	contrasting	worldviews	that	inform	both	the	universal	
presuppositions	inherent	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	and	
the	logic	of	each	distinct	indigenous	people	whose	sociocultural	integrity	is	put	
under	the	umbrella	of	the	United	Nations.		The	stereotyped	characterizations	in	
this	book	of	thinkers	such	as	Boas,	Lévy-Bruhl,	and	Morgan	(p.	101),	besides	
revealing	 a	 poor	 reading	 of	 these	 classics	 of	 anthropology,	 fail	 to	 advance	
the	quest	 for	a	 lucid	appraisal	and	understanding	of	an	 issue	as	complex	as	
international	indigenism.
	 A	fine	point	 in	Niezen’s	assessment	of	 the	generalized	adoption	of	 the	
term	“indigenous	peoples”	is	his	distinction	between	“ethnonationalism”	and	
“indigenism,”	between	peoples	who	have	emerged	from	recently	decolonized	
countries	 and	 peoples	 who	 suffered	 the	 often	 genocidal	 consequences	
of	 the	 colonial	 powers	 in	 the	Americas	 and	Oceania.	 	A	 key	 feature	 that	
distinguishes	the	two	modes	of	nonconformism	is	a	quest	of	secession,	for	while	
ethnonationalists	fight	to	gain	independence	from	oppressive	states,	indigenous	
peoples	struggle	to	regain	what	they	have	lost	rather	than	to	gain	what	they	
have	never	had	and	probably	do	not	want,	i.e.,	statehood.
	 Despite	the	author’s	assertion	that	he	wants	to	study	“the	world,”	he	is	at	
his	best	when	he	brings	up	the	poignant	cases	of	the	Canadian	Crees	and	the	
African	Tuareg.		There	is,	after	all,	something	to	be	said	for	the	anthropologist’s	
ability	to	engage	in	intimate	relationships	with	cultures	not	his	own.
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